S. Hrg. 109-311: Abel Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing

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After 9/11, when the Congressional Joint Inquiry discovered Shaykh’s identity and issued a subpoena for him to testify, Attorney General John Ashcroft refused to allow his agents to serve it. of supervised release of five years on Counts One, Two, Three and Five and three years’ supervised release on Count Six? Weldon gave a talk at The Heritage Foundation with a chart he described as the one handed over on May 23, 2002. There he met bin Atash, who told him to prepare for a “martyrdom mission” in which he would drive a truck full of explosives into a target.

attacks, a small, highly classified military intelligence unit identified Mohamed Atta and three other future hijackers as likely members of a cell of Al Qaeda operating in the United States, according to a former defense intelligence official and a Republican member of Congress. Congressman Weldon reiterated these statements in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 21, 2005.THE COURT: Your offer is to plead guilty to five counts charging you with conspiracy to kill nationals of the United States, conspiracy to murder, kidnap and maim at places outside of the United States, conspiracy to murder, conspiracy to destroy buildings and property of the United States, and conspiracy to destroy national-defense utilities of the United States. Able Danger members were not prohibited from sharing intelligence information with law enforcement authorities or other agencies that could have acted on that information.

It was scheduled for January 5th-8 th 2000 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the Southeast Asian capital known to intelligence analysts as “K. The Senate Committee said its findings were consistent with those of the DoD inspector general, released in September 2006.Coming as it did in early 2000, the identification of Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi was a crucial find for the SOCOM operation. I have learned that, in fact, one of our Federal agencies had, in fact, identified the major New York cell of Mohamed Atta prior to 9/11; and I have learned, Mr. The report mentions Osama Mustafa as one, and Shaykh admits that suspected Saudi agent Omar al-Bayoumi was a friend.

A Time magazine article dated August 14, 2005, reports that Weldon admitted he is no longer sure that Atta's name was on the chart he presented to Hadley and that he was unable to verify whether this was the case, having handed over his only copy, and that a reconstruction was used for post-9/11 presentations. The Advocate does an expansive piece on my findings in HOMICIDE AT ROUGH POINT: the true crime story of how Doris Duke got away with the murder of gay designer Eduardo Tirella in 1966 and how the case was reopened 55 years later after an unknown witness read the book and came forward to tell the truth. Later, the Pentagon denied that the Able Danger data mining had uncovered Atta, al-Shehhi, and the two San Diego hijackers” in early 2000,” says former Cong. CIA will never provide that to you because if you were successful in your effort to target Al Qaeda, you will steal our thunder. In his account Wright puts most of the blame on the CIA, but clearly in its investigation of the African Embassy bombings and what we now know to be their state of awareness of the importance of al-Midhar and that Sana’a (al Hada) safehouse, Squad I-49 of the FBI’s NYO ought to be held equally accountable for not connecting the dots.Speaker, I rise because information has come to my attention over the past several months that is very disturbing. In any case, KSM’s number-two in the planes-as-missiles plot, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, was there, along with Khallad bin Atash, a senior al Qaeda operative who played a key role in executing the African Embassy bombings. The Senate panel of investigators said there was no evidence DoD lawyers stopped analysts from sharing findings with the FBI before the attacks.